SECTION CCLX
"Yudhishthira said, 'Thou sayest that righteousness or duty depends upon
delicate considerations, that is indicated by the conduct of those that
are called good, that it is fraught with restraints (from numerous acts),
and that its indications are also contained in the Vedas. It seems to me,
however, that I have a certain inward light in consequence of which I can
discriminate between right and wrong by inferences.[1127] Numerous
questions that I had intended to ask thee have all been answered by thee.
There is one question, however, that I shall presently ask. It is not
prompted, O king, by desire of empty disputation. All these embodied
creatures, it seems, take birth, exist, and leave their bodies, of their
own nature. Duty and its reverse, therefore, cannot be ascertained, O
Bharata, by study of the scriptures alone.[1128] The duties of a person
who is well off are of one kind. Those of a person who has fallen into
distress are of another kind. How can duty respecting seasons of distress
be ascertained by reading the scriptures alone?[1129] The acts of the
good, thou hast said, constitute righteousness (or duty). The good,
however, are to be ascertained by their acts. The definition, therefore,
has for its foundation, a begging of the question, with the result that
what is meant by conduct of the good remains unsettled. It is seen that
some ordinary person commits unrighteousness while apparently achieving
righteousness. Some extraordinary persons again may be seen who achieve
righteousness by committing acts that are apparently unrighteous.[1130]
Then, again, the proof (of what I say) has been furnished by even those
that are well conversant with the scriptures themselves, for it has been
heard by us that the ordinances of the Vedas disappear gradually in every
successive age. The duties in the Krita age are of one kind. Those in the
Treta are of another kind, and those in the Dwapara are again different.
The duties in the Kali age, again, are entirely of another kind. It
seems, therefore, that duties have been laid down for the respective ages
according to the powers of human beings in the respective ages. When,
therefore, all the declarations in the Vedas do not apply equally to all
the ages, the saying that the declarations of the Vedas are true is only
a popular form of speech indulged in for popular satisfaction. From the
Srutis have originated the Smritis whose scope again is very wide. If the
Vedas be authority for everything, then authority would attach to the
Smritis also for the latter are based on the former. When, however, the
Srutis and the Smritis contradict each other, how can either be
authoritative? Then again, it is seen that when some wicked persons of
great might cause certain portions of certain courses of righteous acts
to be stopped, these are destroyed for ever.[1131] Whether we know it or
know it not, whether we are able to ascertain it or not to ascertain it,
the course of duty is finer than the edge of a razor and grosser than
even a mountain. Righteousness (in the form of sacrifices and other
religious acts) at first appears in the form of the romantic edifices of
vapour seen in the distant sky. When, however, it is examined by the
learned, it disappears and becomes invisible.[1132] Like the small ponds
at which the cattle drink or the shallow aqueducts along cultivated
fields that dry up very soon, the eternal practices inculcated in the
Smritis, falling into discontinuance, at last disappear totally (in the
Kali age). Amongst men that are not good some are seen to become
hypocrites (in respect of the acquisition of righteousness) by suffering
themselves to be urged by desire. Some become so, urged by the wishes of
others. Others, numbering many, tread in the same path, influenced by
diverse other motives of a similar character.[1133] It cannot be denied
that such acts (though accomplished by persons under the influence of
evil passions) are righteous. Fools, again, say that righteousness is an
empty sound among those called good. They ridicule such persons and
regard them as men destitute of reason. Many great men, again, turning
back (from the duties of their own order) betake themselves to the duties
of the kingly order. No such conduct, therefore, is to be seen (as
observed by any man), which is fraught with universal benevolence.[1134]
By a certain course of conduct one becomes really meritorious. That very
course of conduct obstructs another in the acquisition of merit. Another,
by practising at his pleasure that conduct, it is seen, remains
unchanged.[1135] Thus that conduct by which one becomes meritorious
impedes another in the acquisition of merit. One may thus see that all
courses of conduct are seen to lose singleness of purpose and character.
It seems, therefore, that only that which the learned of ancient times
called righteousness is righteousness to this day: and through that
course of conduct (which the learned so settled) the distinctions and
limitations (that govern the world) have become eternal.'"[1136]
